£1.2bn on transfers with £830m inflated in accounts - Man City's 'asterisk era'

Outside Manchester City’s Etihad Stadium is a lustrous silver statue of Sergio Aguero - mouth agape in ecstasy, kit swirling over his head - depicting his goal celebration after securing the club’s first Premier League title.

It is the immortalisation of the most famous goal in English league football history, when City snatched the trophy away from Manchester United in the dying seconds of the 2011-12 season.

But what if the goal never happened? What if Aguero had never played for the club? What if City had opted to abide by football’s financial rules instead of purposefully breaking them through a “disguised funding scheme”?

The revelation that the club has been found guilty of the charges brought against it by the Premier League three and a half years ago has left football fans around the world questioning the legitimacy of City’s achievements between 2009 and 2018, when they were the most successful club in English football and cemented themselves among the global game’s elite.

Some fans are referring to it as the asterisk era, and there is a possibility City could be retroactively stripped of the honours they earned during the period, with some clubs seeking legal advice over potential financial compensation.

So how exactly did City’s “hugely overstated” income impact their actions in the transfer market, how key were the players who were brought in, and what does it all mean for both the past and the future?

Manchester City spent about £1.2bn on new players in the transfer windows between summer 2009 and January 2018.

In that time, the club won seven major trophies - three Premier Leagues, one FA Cup, and three EFL Cups - having previously gone without a significant honour since 1970.

The players they purchased during that time included some of the world’s best, in all areas of the pitch. Multiple were signed for figures in the tens of millions every summer and made a huge contribution to the club’s consistent success.

City did not only generate revenue from sponsorship funds in that time. And income is also spent on many things other than transfers, including player wages, utilities, insurance, infrastructure, marketing, foundations and more.

But the figures underline the fact that City would simply not have been able to purchase the quantity and quality of players they signed during their era of domination had they not been conducting what the commission described as a “concerted campaign to falsify” their financial accounts.

If City’s financial power had been slashed by the extra £830m the commission says they falsely added to their books, their transfer spend would surely have been massively reduced.

Chop the amount in half, say, and maybe they would only have brought in half the amount of players. Or the same amount, but heavily reduced in quality.

Which potentially means no Aguero, no David Silva, no Yaya Toure, no Kevin de Bruyne, or at least a significant reduction in the number or ability of the less glamorous players who were key cogs in the trophy-winning machine.

Would those successes have been achieved had the rule breaking not been going on in tandem? And what would the impact have been on all the other clubs who have played in the Premier League during that time?

Nobody will ever know. The seasons cannot be replayed. And so the outcomes exist in a kind of mixed reality where the world watched them happen, but isn’t sure if they’re really ‘real’.

The era provided the foundation for City’s ongoing success, too, meaning more trophies and TV income, and the chaos of the situation has also unleashed doubt about the present and future.

City have until Friday to mount an appeal. If that appeal is unsuccessful, then, at some point, the club will be given some sort of punishment.

Whether sanctions will retcon the past in any way is unknown.

And about moving forwards? Right now football fans, both of City and other clubs across the country, do not know whether the football they are watching is ‘real’ or not.

Are City actually top of the league and in a title challenge, or will they be docked points later in the season?

If they are linked with another team’s star player, could that transfer happen or will they be unable to make deals at some point?

Will they be in the Premier League next season or will they be expelled and will there need to be a quite significant rejigging of the pyramid to accommodate them somewhere else?

And then there are questions about what comes later down the line.

Is anybody else breaking rules right now, which fans will only find out about in the future?

Does the potential for years of results to be retroactively kiboshed undermine the Premier League’s popularity with fans, players and sponsors?

And can the action fans are watching week in, week out ever fully be trusted again?

The answers to those questions will determine the future of the biggest league in the world’s most popular game.

The intricate web Man City spun to con the Premier League

“To cheat, trick, deceive, delude with false pretences; to impose upon, take in, hoax.”

That is the Oxford English definition of the word “sham”.

And that word appears eight times in the independent commission’s ruling published on Tuesday, which found Manchester City guilty of all charges related to serious breaches of financial rules, and all but one in relation to a failure to co-operate with the investigation.

The 40-page document makes fascinating reading.

It catalogues how the club’s owners, Abu Dhabi United Group, knew from the 2009-10 season that there would be major overspends if the club was to reach the level they wanted to get to.

So, the ruling says, City found a way to boost sponsorship income. Season, after season, after season.

For nine seasons, in fact.

The report shows how the club’s owners were topping up the value of the deals.

The so-called Disguised Funding Scheme is the central plank in a series of charges that Manchester City have been found guilty of by the Premier League.

This scheme managed to hide more than £830m of sponsorship funding, while other devices hid £90m in expenses.

Manchester City were bought by Abu Dhabi investors in 2008 but, the document says, their predicament had become clear from the start of the 2009-10 season.

These were ambitious new owners who did not just want the club to be competitive. They wanted to have the best players and be winners.

That was not going to be possible without spending more money. And lots of it.

Total losses for the 2009-10 campaign were going to exceed what was, at that time, the record single-season financial loss by a Premier League member club. That was Chelsea FC in 2006, of £140m.

According to the ruling, that was a record that the City owners were adamant the club should not break.

The club knew they would likely continue to suffer large losses for at least the following five seasons.

This was when both Uefa and the Premier League were about to bring in financial fair play rules.

This was clearly going to be a problem.

To address this the only option was to significantly increase commercial revenue - and reduce the reliance on their owners.

In early 2010, Manchester City took the first steps to get the additional funding into the club.

City would enter into sponsorship agreements which were record amounts and were significantly above fair market value.

It is referred to as the ‘disguised funding scheme’.

This is how it worked, according to the ruling.

The sponsorship deals were split into two parts: a base fee, and a tagged sum.

The sponsors would pay the base fee.

And the club’s owners would pay the tagged sum.

Ergo, the sponsors would not have to pay the full value of the contract. The club’s owners would pay the vast majority, which enabled them to invest in players.

This, the document states, “gave the misleading impression to third parties (including regulators and its auditors) in its financial statements and any required FFP returns that its commercial revenues from sponsorship agreements were far, far greater than was in fact the case”.

But the club also knew they had to be nimble.

From time to time the disguised funding scheme would be tweaked to “assist with continued concealment” and “reduce the likelihood of difficult questions being asked”.

Commercial income from sponsors totalled £949.94m in the seasons from 2009-10 to 2017-18.

The ruling says only £119.25 million represented base fees.

A total of £830.69 million represented tagged sums - the amount paid by the club’s owners.

Man City have denied the claims and say the Premier League had misunderstood the sponsorship agreements.

However, the panel said it “rejected that explanation as untrue”.

It said it was “concocted well after the event in an attempt to obscure and conceal the realities of the disguised funding scheme”.

An example given of the disguised funding scheme in action: plugging an unexpected shortfall in May 2013.

Less than a week before the end of that 2012-13 financial year the club knew they were £9.9m short of complying with Uefa’s financial rules.

In a matter of days, without sponsors even being approached, a number of modified sponsor agreements were generated which increased recorded sponsorship fees to pay bonuses for events that had already taken place and to pay for a US tour.

The feared Uefa FFP shortfall was thus “plugged”.

In 2012, City launched what it called Project Longbow.

The ruling does say many of the strands of Project Longbow were genuine, and legitimate attempts to achieve the aims of boosting revenues and reducing operating losses.

One strand was not genuine, according to the ruling: the Fordham Arrangement.

This was an agreement between City and a third party called Fordham which was, according to the ruling, “little more than a front”.

Funds from the club’s owners “would be used (and were used) to enable Fordham to acquire from the club (at a sizeable, artificially-inflated price) the club’s entitlement to benefit financially from its players’ image rights”.

It was a “further device by which funds could be paid into the club in a manner that concealed their true origin”.

And this “enabled the club to pretend that such funds represented operating income”.

In the financial statements wrongly recorded as operating income was the sum of £24.5m, and £49.414m was wrongly excluded from operating expenses.

The ruling says the Fordham Arrangement was “operated with the knowledge and approval” of a number of individuals whose names were redacted.

Another way the club attempted to pass the financial rules was to move expensive contracts for players and managers off the books.

This was done by paying remuneration, or wages, through third parties. In reality this was being paid by the owners.

This was “instead recorded in a consultancy agreement” and “concealed the true extent of the club’s liabilities”.

There are three separate cases attributed to this, with all names redacted from the document. These may be published when the full written reasons are released.

City used this method for payments of £8.866m, £7.4m and £0.5m.

“By its conduct the club clearly intended to circumvent the Premier League rules. The club made concerted efforts to stop and frustrate the Premier League investigation”.

This is another damning section, which brings into question the integrity of undisclosed people associated with City.

City served witness statements or documentary evidence from 24 individuals, most of whom gave evidence at the hearing.

This could be problematic at a later date, as the new Independent Football Regulator is able to look at the honesty and integrity of directors and owners.

At present, no one has been named so we do not know the position of the people the ruling referred to.

It said that the evidence given by a number of important factual witnesses “was false in a number of key respects”.

It added that certain factual witnesses provided evidence “that they knew to be untrue and so had been dishonest”.

The ruling also said that City knew that the annual accounts “did not provide a true and fair view of the financial position” and that the club “was reckless as to whether those annual accounts provided a true and fair view”.

All in all, it was said, showed that City failed to act “with utmost good faith” and “breached duties of co-operation that it owed to the Premier League”.

This is how the club’s financial statements for the seasons between 2009-10 and 2017-18 did not show a true and fair view of the financial position: income overstated by over £830m; wrongly excluded expenses by £8.866m; wrongly excluded expenses by £7.4m; wrongly excluded expenses by £0.5m; wrongly recorded as operating income £24.5m via the Fordham Arrangement; wrongly excluded expenses of £49.414m via the Fordham Arrangement.

Brentford in talks with Schade

Brentford are in talks with forward Kevin Schade over a new contract on improved terms after his positive start to the season.

The 24-year-old Germany international has scored three goals in five Premier League matches and started both of Jurgen Klopp’s first two games as national team manager.

Schade is understood to be open to extending his stay, although talks remain at an early stage and are not expected to progress quickly.

The situation is complicated by the fact his current contract has less than two years left to run as it expires in 2028.

The attacker joined the Bees for a then club-record £22m from Freiburg after an initial loan move was made permanent in 2023.

Faes leaves Leicester for UAE club Shabab Al Ahli

Out-of-favour Belgium international defender Wout Faes has left Leicester City to join United Arab Emirates club Shabab Al Ahli.

The 28-year-old had reportedly been on the brink of joining West Ham on transfer deadline day in September, but the move collapsed.

While the summer transfer window in England and across Europe closed on Faes, the Foxes continued to search for a way to rid themselves of one of the club’s highest earners as they adjust to jarring financial realities of life in League One.

With the deadline for moves to the UAE Pro League still days away, interest from the Dubai-based club has allowed Faes to leave Leicester after four years, in which he made more than 130 appearances and played a part in three relegations.

Details of the deal and any payment made to Leicester for the transfer have not been disclosed by either club.

Faes, who has earned 28 caps for Belgium since 2021, made his one and only appearance for the Foxes this term in their League One draw at Barnsley just before the start of the international break earlier in September.

He had spent the second half of last season on loan at Monaco, but the French club did not take up the option to make the move permanent.

It meant he once again took his place among Leicester’s high-profile and high-earning squad which became the focus of a summer clearout after suffering back-to-back relegations from the Premier League and Championship.

Denmark international Jannik Vestergaard had his Leicester contract terminated by mutual consent in July, while Abdul Fatawu left for Ipswich Town, Hamza Choudhury joined Sheffield United and former England midfielder Harry Winks was sold to Italian side Cagliari.

Meanwhile, Victor Kristiansen was sent out on loan to Greek side Panathinaikos, and Stephy Mavididi and Oliver Skipp made similar moves to Watford and Charlton respectively.

Earlier in the summer, forwards Jordan Ayew and Patson Daka, as well as captain Ricardo Pereira were all released at the end of their contracts.

Is Premier League possession football on the way out?

In the early 2000s, Premier League defences tried to make the pitch as small as possible, giving their opposition less space to score in.

Coaches therefore encouraged their attackers to play quickly, taking advantage of open space that saw them face fewer defenders.

Logically, this made total sense.

It was Pep Guardiola’s influence that, in part, flipped this logic on its head over the last decade.

His Manchester City sides looked to force teams back into a compact defence, a challenge that in theory should be harder to break down.

The counter logic was that they were forcing opponents to give them a familiar challenge they were prepared for.

City’s defenders also had big spaces to cover, often standing at the halfway line.

But for Guardiola, those spaces were less worrying if the ball stayed near the opposition’s goal for as long as possible.

After all, if you have the ball, the opposition cannot score.

So why now are teams that dominate the ball dropping points?

Across this season’s opening 50 Premier League matches, teams recording at least 60% possession have won only 36.4% of those games, while in 2023-24, the figure was 53.5%.

Does this suggest possession football is on the way out? Well, the answer isn’t that simple.

Are teams winning because of their low possession, or having less possession because they have taken the lead early?

There could be some truth in both answers.

Let’s use Xabi Alonso’s Chelsea as a case study.

They won their opening games against Fulham and Brighton - 3-2 and 4-3 respectively - with the minority of possession, then drew 2-2 with Hull and lost 3-0 to Brentford despite having considerably more of the ball.

Against Brighton, Chelsea’s 25.6% possession and 146 successful passes were their lowest recorded figures in a Premier League match, with records beginning in 2003-04.

And yet, the Blues scored four goals.

For three of them, accelerating play from throw-ins and counter-attacks allowed their direct attackers to find space against fewer defenders.

This dynamic can partly be explained by Fabian Hurzeler’s Brighton wanting to dominate the ball - with only Manchester City averaging more possession than the Seagulls this season - which played into Chelsea’s hands.

Joao Pedro, Cole Palmer, Pedro Neto and Morgan Rogers boast skillsets suited to transition-heavy football, and the low possession against Brighton helped them play to their strengths.

By breaking quickly, Chelsea scored their third against Brighton in what became a two-against-two situation.

Counter-attacking comes with a stigma.

It is more accepted underdogs like newly promoted Hull will play this way. For bigger teams, there is an expectation to eventually control the game with the ball.

This makes a low-possession approach harder to sell long term, even if the players might look better conceding possession.

And that disconnect between players’ skillsets and tactics could help explain some dropped points.

Alongside Chelsea, Manchester United have also suffered in this way. Under Michael Carrick, they have averaged 1.5 points per game with more than 50% possession. With less, that rises to 2.6.

Clubs without the same expectation, like Brentford, Leeds and Hull, can concede possession and have built squads for that style.

With impressive box defenders, dangerous counter-attackers and set-piece specialists, their tactics can align with their players’ strengths, helping them compete against more less aligned opponents, irrespective of their wealth gap.

In recent seasons, there has been a rise in man-to-man pressure that has made building out from the back challenging.

Teams, as a result, have looked to play long over the press or past its first line into space for players to drive with the ball - think the likes of City’s Nico O’Reilly or Arsenal’s Declan Rice.

Both of these have been great solutions to the initial problem, but it does mean that teams full of physical athletes, focused on bringing down long passes or driving with the ball over distance, could be less suited to the intricate play required to unlock stubborn defences - a situation commonly faced by teams who have more of the ball.

To dominate in 2026 likely requires a squad that has enough solutions in small spaces as well as big ones.

In this example we see Liverpool look to press Manchester City high. City play the ball through the pressure into Nico O’Reilly behind Liverpool’s first line of pressure.

O’Reilly then uses his ball-carrying ability to take advantage of the big space ahead of him.

Opponents have used man-to-man defending closer to goal too, making it harder to find the unmarked player, a key attacking principle used in Guardiola’s positional play.

With players marked, attacks can then depend on winning one-against-one situations, requiring individual quality often in the form of dribbling.

Given the way teams have been built over the last few years, certain sides may lack this type of problem solver.

It is important to note possession is an average across a match, which can hide how the scoreline changes a team’s approach.

Chelsea scored within seven minutes in each of their opening four league games after which opponents pushed forward looking for a goal. The Blues dropped deeper, defending their lead and attacking the space left behind.

Across their opening five matches, Chelsea averaged 51.4% possession when level, 34.5% when ahead and 67.2% when behind - highlighting how much their possession has varied with the score.

Interestingly, protecting a lead created favourable opportunities for Chelsea’s attackers to play intuitively, carry the ball and attack space. When chasing a goal, they had more possession but appeared to lack solutions against compact defences.

Arsenal show the value of being able to do both parts well when needed.

Bukayo Saka and Max Dowman’s dribbling, combined with the passing of Martin Odegaard, Martin Zubimendi, Bruno Guimaraes and Christos Tzolis, provides repeatable solutions against packed defences.

Their set-piece threat can also give them the lead when clear chances are difficult to create despite dominating the ball.

For Max Dowman’s goal against Ipswich, Arsenal’s ability to keep the ball and unlock defences was on show.

Once ahead, Arsenal’s possession falls from 60.4% to 56.6% - a small drop but a signal of intent.

Gabriel, Ezri Konsa, Jurrien Timber and Rice then offer the defensive quality to control the game with less of the ball.

Manchester City protect leads differently. Their possession remains at 64.9% when ahead. This approach works partly because it is familiar to the squad Enzo Maresca inherited from Guardiola in the summer.

Rather than repeatedly defending their penalty area, they protect their advantage by keeping the ball and keeping opponents away from their goal given their technical quality.

From all of the successful examples, the same objective is being achieved: a game that suits your players and one that makes the opposing players uncomfortable.

“If you are brave, they have to play a game that is not [the opponent’s] preferred game,” current Liverpool boss Andoni Iraola told The Independent in 2025.

At the time, he was managing Bournemouth - a team notorious for winning with less of the ball against some of the league’s best.

It would be fair to argue fewer teams in the league now have the players or the solutions needed to break down teams given the evolution in defensive tactics, and advantages are more commonly found in attacking the big spaces.

Therefore bridging that gap, from thriving without the ball to dominating with it, will take time for those wanting to do so.

But at the top level, this is time not all coaches are afforded.