Premier League joins call for Fifa reforms

The Premier League has joined three of its top European counterparts in calling for “fundamental” reform of the way that Fifa is run, claiming its president Gianni Infantino has “actively promoted exploitative ideas”.

In a joint statement with Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s Bundesliga, and Italy’s Serie A, the English top flight says it is speaking out “because we understand how Fifa’s relentless expansionism affects everyone”.

The four leagues say the shake-up is needed to make world football’s governing body “transparent, objective, proportionate and inclusive” and claim that “our sport cannot grow globally if its foundations are undermined”.

It comes days after Infantino proposed an external review of how Fifa operates amid the ongoing crisis over his failed plan to sell a stake in the World Cup to private investors, which sparked a global outcry.

Referencing “one of the biggest abuses of power in Fifa’s history”, the four leagues say that “while football’s stakeholders ultimately forced the withdrawal of the Fifa Forward Enterprise scheme, the conditions that led to FFE remain”.

The statement added: “The Fifa president has now acknowledged the need for reform, but it is not enough for surface-level, process changes to be explored in the aftermath of FFE – fundamental governance reform is essential to restore clear constitutional boundaries within Fifa, including confidence that individual disciplinary matters remain demonstrably insulated from political interference.”

That is known to be a reference to the cancelled suspension of United States forward Folarin Balogun at the World Cup after US President Donald Trump called Infantino asking for the striker’s ban to be reviewed.

“Fifa’s governance problem goes far beyond the role of one individual,” the leagues added.

“The wider question is whether Fifa’s president should simultaneously wield such regulatory, commercial and political power without effective checks and balances, including the agreement of affected stakeholders… governance that concentrates unchecked regulatory, commercial and political power in a single office, while relegating affected stakeholders to mere advisory status, is not fit for purpose.”

Fifa has been approached for comment.

The four leagues call on Fifa to; establish a permanent body representing key stakeholders, including leagues, clubs, and players from across men’s and women’s football which has “a meaningful role in [its] decision-making process”.

Ensure “evidence-based decision-making”, with any major proposal subject to an independent assessment evaluating the impact on all stakeholders.

Create a separation between Fifa’s regulatory role and its commercial function via “robust institutional safeguards to preserve trust, legitimacy and accountability” with ethics, financial oversight and electoral bodies “that are genuinely independent of the Fifa administration and presidency”.

Two years ago, Europe’s top leagues - along with players’ union Fifpro - filed a legal complaint against Fifa with the European Commission over what they claimed was an “abuse of dominance” by world football’s governing body over the expansion of the international fixture calendar and an alleged lack of consultation.

Fifa denied that, and accused some leagues of “hypocrisy” and acting “without consideration to everyone else in the world”.

They claim that their legal action “is a consequence of a flawed governance framework in which Fifa can use its regulatory authority to advance its own commercial objectives without accounting for the impact on the economic and social sustainability of national competitions that affect all stakeholders. This must change now for the sake of football”.

Despite three confederations calling for him to step down, Infantino has said he will stand for re-election in March, with his opponents having until 18 November to find an alternative candidate.

The four leagues want candidates to support their proposals and say: “Now is the moment to decide not only who will lead Fifa, but also how Fifa should be led. Leagues have a crucial role to play in this process, and we want to ensure that the voice of every league is heard.”

The letter is signed by Richard Masters, chief executive of the Premier League, Marc Lenz, CEO of the Bundesliga, Javier Tebas, president of La Liga, and Luigi De Siervo, CEO of Serie A.

Last month Masters told BBC Sport that Infantino had “pressed the self-destruct button” by delivering “a self-inflicted wound” over FFE.

How Man City overhauled their squad from a 650,000-strong database

Inside the confines of Manchester City’s sophisticated data operation is a fundamental phrase its experts work towards: “What does it take to win?”

In practice, the motto is broken down into three sections: identifying players, evaluating them and assessing how the club could improve them, all with a view to enhancing the statistical probability of City winning the Premier League.

Last season, the club’s data department projected they would be there or thereabouts when it came to the title race, but their metrics indicated Arsenal were favourites to be champions. They were accurate.

This time around, City prefer to keep their projections under wraps - but five wins from five Premier League games have prompted predictions from supporters and pundits they will again be the Gunners’ closest challengers.

City’s devotion to data is at the heart of their efforts to close the gap on Arsenal and BBC Sport has been given unprecedented access to the inner workings of the club’s metrics machine as we uncover some of the secrets guiding their work - particularly regarding player recruitment and sales.

Their work is a sign of the times in the Premier League, with clubs across the top flight and beyond increasingly using data for transfers and monitoring their teams’ performance.

At City, one of the fundamental aims is to reduce risk of any market transaction, be it a purchase or a sale.

City grade players based on overall characteristics and the system they play in at their current club and how the manager is asking him and the team to play.

Once those aspects are observed, City’s aim is to understand not just how good the player is but how good he could become at the Etihad.

Since winning the Treble in 2023, City’s squad has undergone a vast overhaul using this approach. Only four players from that historic campaign remain.

It is crucial to stress, however, that while data has made an indefinite impact on how City operate in the transfer market, the work of traditional scouts continues to be the primary gauge of whether they decide to move for a player.

“Data plays a role in our decision-making, but it is just one part of the overall picture,” City sporting director Hugo Viana told BBC Sport.

“We know data cannot tell us everything about a player. It cannot fully show a person’s character, mentality or behaviour. That is why we study data insights but focus on the expertise of our scouts and other specialists.”

The prominence of data, however, has grown significantly behind the scenes at the Etihad.

Here BBC Sport can take you to the core of some of City’s key transfer calls from their extensive three-year squad revamp - including the £116m signing of Elliot Anderson.

The starting point for any new signing is City’s database of 650,000 footballers from around the world.

The next step is the brief: what sort of player is the club wanting to recruit. This usually starts with a position, though that process isn’t as simple as it sounds.

City, for example, categorise their full-backs into three types: those who are defensive, those who come inside, and those who play high and wide.

Once the club’s data departments have the brief, filters that grade a player’s overall ability are applied to whittle down the 650,000-man database to 20-50 names.

Juventus full-back Andrea Cambiaso is one player who has been on City’s radar after the data highlighted him, particularly his ability to coming inside to build play in midfield. That he is comfortable with both feet rated highly on the data, too.

In accordance with the data and the scouting reports it was decided the club would not proceed with their interest in Cambiaso in the previous window, but City’s approach is likely to mean he will continue to be monitored.

The longlist of 20-50 names is cross-referenced with the scouting longlist. Generally there is a significant overlap between the players identified by data and the ones already on scouts’ radar.

From there, further, more refined metrics are applied to rank and prioritise the longlist.

Scouts will then complete further diligence on the players to reduce the list to a maximum of about six players.

At this point, the club will complete deeper dives into the remaining players, including diligence on their injury record, athletic performance and behavioural habits.

The information is then collated into individual reports called acquisition packs which contain all the key metrics used to inform the decision on a player.

This includes a ‘radar chart’, which rates a range of specific on-field metrics.

For example, when Jeremy Doku was signed in 2023, then manager Pep Guardiola decided he wanted a winger who was direct, akin to Leroy Sane, because at the time they had Jack Grealish and Riyad Mahrez, who preferred to keep the ball and cut inside.

Among the criteria applied in City’s brief were the following: making (running into) the box, pressure regains, take-on percentage and opposition-half pressure.

Doku’s overall numbers ticked the boxes Guardiola was looking for, although the Belgian’s ‘making the box’ score was among his lowest readings.

Since his arrival, Doku has improved this rating - an example City say shows how their data systems are helping to improve existing players.

There is also a ‘utilisation chart’ that records how often the player has been used over a three-year period, as well as a scouting grade that indicates how highly the traditional scouts rate the individual.

Each player is also awarded an overall “current impact score” - which predicts what impression he would be expected to make immediately on signing - and a “potential impact score” that projects the contribution the player could make in the future.

Perhaps the most intriguing reading on the acquisition packs is a player’s “action value score”. This positions them in a league table that includes City players and ones from rival clubs who play in a similar role.

Once the acquisition reports are evaluated, the list is further reduced to 2-3 players once City’s valuation of the player has been factored in.

Data contributes heavily to the price range City believe a player falls in, and the valuation is never a single number.

A decision is then made on which player is the priority, though all players on the shortlist are worked on simultaneously in the event of changing circumstances, for example if a player becomes unavailable.

Indeed, being able to move according to the market is something the data team feel they have become adept at.

The sudden emergence of Yan Diomande last season led to City completing checks on him before he joined Real Madrid from RB Leipzig.

The club also paid close attention to Eduardo Camavinga’s metrics in case Real decided to sell a midfielder.

Anderson was an obvious signing for a top Premier League club. The 23-year-old had developed into a key player for Nottingham Forest. An added appeal was the fact he is English, and had cemented his position in the national team.

City fought off other top clubs, including Manchester United, to sign him.

But the way City analysed it underlines their incredibly forensic approach even when, outwardly, it might be considered they did not need to be so comprehensive given Anderson’s obvious talents.

The fact they still used their algorithm and went through all their normal steps says a lot about elite football in the modern day - and also the limitations of data alone.

That is because - perhaps surprisingly - Anderson’s metrics didn’t necessarily catch the eye.

At the start of last season, despite emerging uncertainty over Guardiola’s future, the club knew they would be in the market for at least one central midfielder come the summer.

They knew Bernardo Silva was leaving while there were doubts over the futures of Rodri and Nico Gonzalez.

There was an acknowledgement that replacing Silva and Rodri like-for-like would be virtually impossible, so they looked for a player who was equally adept at building play from either deep or high central midfield.

As last season developed, doubt also emerged over the future of Tijjani Reijnders - but Enzo Fernandez was viewed as the favoured replacement for the Dutchman.

Anderson made the initial cut from the 650,000-man database to the longlist - but was not high in that group. However, his metric readings didn’t immediately scream out the “no-brainer” he ultimately became.

As City took a closer look, there was an acknowledgement Anderson’s case does highlight some of the limitations of data.

Anderson did not score lots of goals for Forest, or consistently provide assists. Because, generally speaking, Forest aren’t a possession team like City, his general metrics in their algorithm did not grab the attention.

With that in mind, City’s data analysts had to consider that, because Anderson was generally playing closer to his own goal than he would at City, he wasn’t getting the opportunities to impress in the final third of the pitch.

So they paid close attention to what he was doing at Forest and modelled his potential role in a City team that generally plays closer to the opposition’s goal, dominates possession and has more elite players.

Among the criteria graded on Anderson’s ‘radar chart’ were defensive regains, duel success, line-breaking passes, aerial-duel success and defensive errors.

With his reading for defensive errors, it was acknowledged that, because Forest were a transitional side, some were a result of the area of the pitch in which he was asked to operate.

He may, for example, have regained possession deep inside his own half but lost the ball because he had to play a longer and a riskier pass after being asked to play forward quickly.

In the same scenario at City, it is anticipated Anderson would have options to play a shorter pass with a greater success rate.

“Just because a player doesn’t have the opportunity to perform a particular action on a regular basis because of the team he is playing doesn’t mean he can’t do it,” said a source.

Anderson’s data readings improved significantly as the season developed, which compelled the club’s scouts to watch him on a regular basis.

He stood up very favourably against City’s existing midfielders - and a list of rival players the club had identified as possible signings in that area.

The results of the diligence completed by City’s data team, scouts and other experts meant that even though Anderson’s price increased beyond what City believed was his true valuation, they felt the risk was low.

“Elliot Anderson is a great example of how the process works,” Viana said. “The data was positive for Elliot and gave us real confidence in his profile, but it was the insight from our scouts and wider performance team that helped us understand the player and his attributes and this proved our belief that he was the right fit for the club.”

BBC Sport was also provided with fascinating insight into how data was used to sign Julian Alvarez from River Plate for £14m in 2022.

The initial recommendation came from scouts, and given Alvarez was not a player originally identified by his metrics, the data team had to take a closer look.

Because the Argentine league isn’t recognised as one of the strongest globally, City’s general data settings mean players will reach a natural ceiling with their readings in comparison to those playing in one of Europe’s top five divisions.

So, City dug deeper into Alvarez’s stats, and his impact on both the ball and River’s scorelines.

The stats showed he was by far the best player in the Argentine top flight, and City believed they had enough evidence to say he would develop into a starter for a top-half club in one of Europe’s top five leagues within two-and-a-half years.

The data model valued Alvarez between £26m and £40m. City signed him for £14m so believed they were signing an undervalued player.

Alvarez’s projected value was £70m after three years. They eventually sold him to Atletico Madrid in 2024 for £81m.

The signing of Abdukodir Khusanov from Lens also provides intriguing insight into City’s reliance on data.

The 22-year-old didn’t initially make City’s 50-man longlist, but on closer inspection they found while his output on the ball needed to improve, his physical data - for example his covering runs behind - was through the roof.

Khusanov’s on-the-ball metrics, City say, have improved significantly since he signed in January 2025.

The departure of Guardiola and the arrival of Enzo Maresca is not expected to alter the club’s approach significantly.

The key metrics Maresca looks for in a player are understood to be very similar to Guardiola’s, with the notable difference that the Italian prefers his full-backs to be more direct.

Rooted in City’s coach recruitment process is a certain team philosophy and way of playing, with any new manager expected to produce a side that is possession dominant, can press high, regain possession high up the pitch, produce quality chances and entertain.

That philosophy was designed before Guardiola’s appointment, and the Spaniard produced the purest form of City’s footballing ideology.

With that in mind, the change in manager has not drastically altered the way City’s data department approach their work.

Maresca will continue to work closely with them as he looks to build his own dynasty - but much of the hard work in building a squad to last is complete.

Before City’s Treble-winning season, the internal data indicators were such that the club knew they would soon need to overhaul a squad that had reached its peak.

Selling players such as Kevin de Bruyne, Kyle Walker, Riyad Mahrez and Ilkay Gundogan wasn’t easy given their illustrious service and the fact they were still performing at a very high level.

Data, though, allows the club to spot declining trends well in advance - often two or three years - before a player is offloaded.

Those particular metrics help City identify when the right time is to sell a player - perhaps even before the buying club have spotted a drop in performance.

And when those trends are identified, the club can plan well in advance.

From there the club decide whether to start embedding a player from the academy or enter the market to replace.

Ayyoub Bouaddi’s arrival from Lille this summer is a prime example. At 18, City realise he isn’t necessarily going to have a profound impact this season - but the club believe the Moroccan will be able to make a bigger contribution within two years.

After the Treble season, the recruitment remit at City was to lower the average age of the squad and build a set of players that could deliver sustained success.

But doing that at City comes with a catch. Because at City, the team are always expected to compete for trophies.

Lowering the age of a squad is one thing; doing so while continuing to win is far more complicated.

In previous years, for example, City’s data systems identified former Brighton trio Moises Caicedo, Marc Cucurella and Carlos Baleba, who have been lauded as data successes.

But there was a sense at City that the development of such signings would take too long for them to make an impact on a team that has the remit of winning titles or assets that could be developed and sold for a profit.

City have successfully lowered the average age of the squad to the extent they now have the third youngest set of players in the Premier League behind Newcastle and Chelsea.

But with the signings of goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma, defender Marc Guehi, and Fernandez and Anderson they have added players who can not only grow with that new generation but also already have vast experience of top-level football.

City’s data indicates their current squad will not peak for another two to three years - but also projects they are likely to be among the title challengers this season.

Time will tell if they are right.

How PSG's Ballon d'Or duo are pushing each other on

The Ballon d’Or is celebrating its 70th anniversary and the winner will be announced at a ceremony in London on 26 October.

Paris St-Germain won almost all before them last season, so it’s no surprise the team’s best are up for the 2026 Ballon d’Or.

The French and European champions have 10 players shortlisted for the greatest individual prize in football, which will be awarded at a ceremony in London on 26 October.

While there can only be one winner, team-mates Ousmane Dembele and Khvicha Kvaratskhelia are backing each other to collect the prize.

Speaking exclusively to BBC Sport, they have even suggested sharing the award.

“We can cut it in two,” joked Dembele, before adding “honestly, he [Kvaratskhelia] deserves it, the season he had was exceptional”.

Kvaratskhelia told BBC Sport journalist Julien Laurens: “Of course it’s him [Dembele], the season he had last year, he deserves it.”

The pair’s reaction won’t surprise PSG fans, who watched the duo ruthlessly and selflessly link up on countless occasions during their side’s Champions League title defence last season.

So, how do they complement each other’s game so well, and could the race for this year’s Ballon d’Or be a PSG one-two?

PSG made just one signing in January 2025, the last window before their first Champions League title later that year, and it was to bring in Kvaratskhelia for £59m from Napoli.

The then 23-year-old Georgia forward was already a hero in Naples, nicknamed ‘Kvaradona’ by supporters during Napoli’s 2022-23 title-winning campaign.

Full of flare, technically superb and forward-thinking, Kvaratskhelia’s play was once compared to George Best by Italian legend Gianfranco Zola - although Kvaratskhelia himself cites Cristiano Ronaldo as his biggest inspiration.

Like his idol, Kvaratskhelia has an impressive work-rate and winning mentality. PSG have won 10 trophies out of a possible 12 since his transfer.

“[He’s] electric,” team-mate Dembele told BBC Sport.

“Every time he has the ball something can happen. Every time he goes one v one, he provokes the opponent.

“He has shown all his quality. Especially last season where he had a really, really good season.

“Thankfully we didn’t let him go to the Premier League.”

Kvaratskhelia was named the Champions League’s best player of last season, his 10 goals and six assists meaning he averaged a goal contribution in Europe’s premier club competition every 72 minutes.

And he did most of his best work towards the business end of the tournament, becoming the first player to score or assist in seven consecutive knockout appearances in a single Champions League campaign.

Kvaratskhelia says his motivation comes from his father, who played for Dinamo Tbilisi and the Azerbaijani national team.

Like his father, Khvicha started his career at Tbilisi before playing for Lokomotiv Moscow and Rubin Kazan in Russia, until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted a move back home - to Dinamo Batumi, and then on to Napoli.

“I think for the big nations it’s really difficult to understand what [winning a Ballon d’Or] would mean for the small country [like Georgia],” Kvaratskhelia told BBC Sport.

“It’s something that is very far, it’s like impossible, of course I will be the happiest guy because I want to make my family and country proud.”

While defenders double up to deal with Kvaratskhelia on the left wing, France forward Dembele is finding even more joy down the right.

The 29-year-old’s blistering pace and cool finishing helped him to a combined 31 goals and assists last season which, thanks to a low workload in terms of gametime, worked out to 1.27 goal contributions per 90 minutes.

Only Harry Kane boasted a better rate among players in Europe’s top five leagues last term.

The current Ballon d’Or holder, Dembele also scored six goals in 10 appearances for France in 2026 as his side reached the semi-finals of the World Cup.

“He’s an amazing player,” Kvaratskhelia told BBC Sport.

“The way he leads the team is important, the way his personality and what he gives the team on the pitch is really incredible, and the season he had last year, it was amazing.

“I think we understand each other very, very much. It’s easy to understand what he will make and you just have to make some move and he will give you a ball wherever he wants and wherever you are waiting.”

Dembele’s goal threat by now is well-known and at PSG he has shown the quality that persuaded Barcelona to once pay £135.5m to sign him from Borussia Dortmund in 2017.

It may not have worked out in Spain but it meant PSG were able to pick up Dembele for a bargain £43.5m in 2023 and, since Kylian Mbappe left for Real Madrid, the Parisians have made Dembele their main star.

“I didn’t change,” Dembele added. “I played my game - last season and the one before when I won the Ballon d’Or - [and] I stayed the same person.

“When you win it for the first time, you don’t want people to say that you were lucky. So you want to continue to be at the top.”

If not PSG duo Dembele and Kvaratskhelia, then who?

Well, England captain Harry Kane is actually odds-on to win after a club record 61 goals in 51 games for German double winners Bayern Munich last season. He also scored six times at the World Cup.

Lamine Yamal, who won La Liga with Barcelona and the World Cup with Spain, is second favourite - followed by his club and international team-mate Rodri.

Real Madrid forward Mbappe scored 42 goals in 44 games for his club last season and won the World Cup Golden Boot with 10 goals on his way to becoming the World Cup’s all-time record goalscorer.

Meanwhile, Inter Miami forward Lionel Messi, who is looking to win his ninth Ballon d’Or, has also been nominated.

As has Dembele and Kvaratskhelia’s team-mate Ferran Torres, who scored Spain’s winner in the World Cup final.

The Ballon d’Or is celebrating its 70th anniversary, with the choice of venue - in London - a tribute to the first winner, Englishman Sir Stanley Matthews.

The 30-man shortlist: Jude Bellingham (Real Madrid/England), Pau Cubarsi (Barcelona/Spain), Marc Cucurella (Real Madrid/Spain), Ousmane Dembele (Paris St-Germain/France), Luis Diaz (Bayern Munich/Colombia), Bruno Fernandes (Manchester United/Portugal), Gabriel (Arsenal/Brazil), Erling Haaland (Manchester City/Norway), Achraf Hakimi (Paris St-Germain/Morocco), Harry Kane (Bayern Munich/England), Khvicha Kvaratskhelia (Paris St-Germain/Georgia), Lamine Yamal (Barcelona/Spain), Sadio Mane (Al-Nassr/Senegal), Marquinhos (Paris St-Germain/Brazil), Lautaro Martinez (Inter Milan/Argentina), Kylian Mbappe (Real Madrid/France), Nuno Mendes (Paris St-Germain/Portugal), Lionel Messi (Inter Miami/Argentina), Joao Neves (Paris St-Germain/Portugal), Michael Olise (Bayern Munich/France), Willian Pacho (Paris St-Germain/Ecuador), Julian Quinones (Al-Qadsiah/Mexico), Declan Rice (Arsenal/England), Rodri (Barcelona/Spain), Fabian Ruiz (Paris St-Germain/Spain), William Saliba (Arsenal/France), Ferran Torres (Paris St-Germain/Spain), Dayot Upamecano (Bayern Munich/France), Vinicius Jr (Real Madrid/Brazil), Vitinha (Paris St-Germain/Portugal).

Uefa fears Premier League impact on transfer market

Morgan Rogers joined Chelsea from Aston Villa in a deal worth £118m

Uefa believes “a clear two-speed system” is emerging in the transfer market as a result of the huge spending by Premier League clubs this summer.

In its latest European club talent and competition landscape report, European football’s governing body laid bare just how dominant the transfer activity of English clubs has become.

Uefa’s report said that the estimated €4.6bn (£4bn) spend by Premier League clubs is “larger than that of the next eight largest European countries combined”.

Andrea Traverso, Uefa’s executive director of finance, said that this trend “raises concerns”.

“Transfer values continue to rise sharply, particularly in the English market, increasing future pressure on club financial results,” Traverso wrote.

“These developments also point to an increasing concentration of talent and a growing polarisation of the market, with the emergence of a clear two-speed system.

“English clubs were involved in more than 60% of the deals and paid an average of around €24m (£20.7m) per inbound player, compared with only around €4m (£3.4m) to €5m (£4.3m) in the other major European leagues, underlining a widening gap in purchasing power.”

Traverso said that any “correction in transfer values” or “slowdown in buyer demand” could have serious implications for any club carrying debt.

He added that it has created “a more fragile model” which has left clubs “increasingly dependent on continued market inflation and liquidity”.

The report set out that the transfer spend of the 20 Premier League clubs this year is “equivalent to 56% of their annual revenue” - much higher than the 33% average of the pre-Covid decade.

Uefa also highlighted the increasing trend for English clubs to do big-value transfers between each other, which showed a 44% increase to €1.55bn (£1.33bn).

The English domestic market was “as large in fee value as the next five market flows combined”.

A market flow describes league-to-league deals. After the English domestic market, the next most lucrative was the German Bundesliga to the Premier League, at €690m (£594m).

The number of European transfer fees paid above €50m has significantly increased, from 14 in the summer of 2024 to 23 in 2025. In 2026 there was another jump to 35 such deals, of which Premier League clubs were responsible for 29.

With pressure to pass financial regulations, clubs have increasingly looked to sell academy players as they provide pure profit on the books.

European clubs generated an estimated profit of €6.8bn (£5.85bn) on these sales over the summer, an increase of €655m (£564bn) on 2025.

Uefa also found little evidence of clubs using multi-club ownership structures to move players for inflated or reduced fees.

Total transfer fees of such deals were €152m (£130.8m) with an estimated market value of €159m (£136.8m).

More than half of this spend came from transfers between Chelsea and Strasbourg.

Why this break has come at the worst time for De Zerbi & Spurs

Big spending always means big ambitions, but shelling out so much money on so many players the way Tottenham did this summer produces problems for any manager, and there is no quick fix.

If I was given a bundle of cash and asked to buy an outfit for a wedding, and I spent every penny of it on pink shoes, brown trousers, yellow shirt and orange tie, then I am sure you would all say that just doesn’t work.

That is similar to what has happened at Spurs, where the board backed Roberto de Zerbi to the hilt with an outlay on new players of around £400m.

It was an almost unprecedented occurrence from a club that has always been renowned for being careful with investment in their team, and it sent expectations from many Spurs supporters through the roof.

The club had just avoided relegation two seasons running, finishing 17th twice in a row, but suddenly some fans were looking forward to a season competing for trophies and a top-four finish.

Their early results and performances have been disappointing, of course, but fans have to understand all the different factors that affect you when you are building a team - and it is ridiculous to suggest De Zerbi should be under pressure already, especially after he kept them up last season.

De Zerbi took over as Spurs boss with seven games to go last season and the club 17th in the Premier League. Three wins and two draws were enough to keep them up.

Finding a way for your club to win takes a manager in lots of different directions but they all involve time - on the grass or with social interaction with the players.

Not only has De Zerbi not been given that early time and opportunity, the majority of his players have now been taken away from him for another three weeks on international duty.

De Zerbi has many other issues to deal with, from Tottenham’s poor home form to their inability to recover from conceding the first goal in games.

But his biggest challenge right now will be to fit those players who have just arrived in with the ones already at the club, into a unit that plays as a team and produces results so that the money the club has spent is justified.

All of this will take time, and patience, and all the kinds of little detail that supporters never see.

In my day, we were given time to create a team, and a family. For today’s managers, time seems more limited than ever.

We are only five games into the season but there are already some Spurs fans who seem to think De Zerbi is the worst manager in the world, even though he has proved elsewhere how good he is.

I like De Zerbi’s passion, and his approach. That will count for nothing if Spurs don’t eventually produce, but let’s give him a proper chance.

Spurs, Fulham and Bournemouth are the only top-flight teams yet to win a league game this season.

De Zerbi is a very passionate, straight-talking and ambitious manager who demands total commitment and backing from his board.

He has definitely had that at Spurs, which has left people wondering why he has made such a slow start.

But, before the season started, I thought his biggest challenge with so many different types of players arriving would be to put players together that fit as a team, not as a group of individuals.

I’ve been in that situation myself, for example in my early days at Stoke, when I signed Gerry Taggart and Michael Duberry to play together, two centre-halves who were complete opposites in relation to how they dealt with space on the pitch.

Gerry always wanted to drop off deeper because he wasn’t overly quick, whereas Michael was fast and didn’t ever worry about leaving space behind him.

I couldn’t make Gerry any quicker, so common sense locked in and I had to convince Michael that he would have to take a step away from his main strengths of pace and power and work along Gerry’s lines instead.

We spent a great deal of time on the grass in training until we finally got both working in unison. Both were different, but they understood the importance of working together as a pair for the benefit of the team. Even so, it still took time for it to click.

For any manager trying to build a successful team by developing combinations like that, the main thing you need is time with your players.

It can happen where a lot of new players settle in quickly at the same time and the team starts well - like Sunderland last season, or Brighton pretty much every year when they have lost several key players - but the difference is that while those clubs might also have changed their manager, they have not changed their identity.

Whether it is Sunderland and Brighton, or Brentford and Bournemouth, they all have a set identity so that when they look for a player to fit in a certain position, he has to have certain strengths.

When you don’t have that solid base behind you, knowing exactly what is needed for certain positions, then bringing 10 new signings and all in one window like Spurs have just done, is going to create many issues for the coach.

Each player has a different personality and needs different amount of time to settle in, not only to a new environment but also to adjust to the demands of a very single-minded and demanding coach like De Zerbi is.

This settling-in period would have been covered if all the players had had a pre-season together, to get up to speed with their team-mates and what De Zerbi is asking of them, with his front-foot style of play.

That did not happen, and then even after the season started, Spurs were still adding to their squad.

Coaching a team to be a team takes time, patience and a sound idea of the strengths of all your players.

Even when you have got that, trying to knit every player together takes time, and that is still De Zerbi’s issue now.

For starters, he was always playing catch-up. Because all of his players were not in place when the season began, he missed the opportunity to assess his squad and impose his own principles on his top group of players.

He is a coach at heart and will want to be out on the training pitch conducting a system of work for the team, in and out of possession, that he believes will bring success to the club. This international break means he cannot do that with all his players.

Another issue De Zerbi has is that he has only been in the job a few months and he is still getting to know the existing players, not just the new ones, on and off the grass.

On it, you need to find out who understands the importance of teamwork and who doesn’t, to iron out shortcomings and see what works and what doesn’t.

An example of when you realise something doesn’t work was my experience at a club who had just bought a right-back from a top Premier League team, for more than £1m which was big money at the time.

We were struggling at the bottom of the league when I came in and needed a direction on the pitch that would bring better results.

During the defensive work we were doing in training, the full-back kept picking up what were, in my opinion, poor positions while covering from the opposite side to where the ball was.

I must have stopped the session on at least four occasions to remonstrate with him and give my view, but in the end the lad told me that this is not what he believed was right.

I immediately replaced him with a young full-back from the reserves who had been playing for the opposition in the drill, who understood his role was for the team, and not for himself.

Getting things right off the pitch is so important too, and that involves getting to know what your players’ characters are like, finding out what they are like as individuals, and understanding their lifestyles.

I had three South American players at West Brom who were fantastic lads but we still had to look after them.

I spoke to my assistant, David Kemp, about taking them and their families out for dinner, and by spending time with them and their children and their wives I believe we won a degree of respect and trust that we would never have had if we had not bothered to meet them all together as a family.

You have to realise that players from different cultures can be used to living a different lifestyle, and this can make a difference to how quickly or how well they fit in.

I had one player in the Premier League whose routine I just could not believe, yet he became such an integral part of keeping a struggling club up.

His 24 hours typically played out like this - training from 8.30am to 1pm, home and bed until 9 or 10pm and then up and out again for dinner and then a casino or whatever, until the early hours.

Then he would be up for training, and he would go again.

It took me a few weeks to get to the bottom of this but, once I confronted him, he was adamant that his routine suited his lifestyle. He certainly knew the best restaurants around town, but his performances were always of the highest quality on the pitch.

Did he heed my advice? I think he did, but he was such a great lad, top player and a great team member that he wasn’t a problem anyway.

He had been a bit isolated from the rest of the squad at first, but it just took him some time to integrate.

Again, finding out about him as an individual and making personal contact with him, was important, and it was something I always saw as vital with all my players.

Tony Pulis was speaking to BBC Sport’s Chris Bevan.