Liverpool sack head coach Slot and approach Iraola

Head coach Arne Slot has been sacked by Liverpool after two seasons in charge.

The Dutchman, 47, guided the Reds to their 20th league title in his debut season but they have struggled during his second year, finishing fifth in the Premier League.

Recently departed Bournemouth boss Andoni Iraola is the leading contender to replace Slot.

The club have approached the Spaniard to discuss the role.

Despite still qualifying for next season’s Champions League, Liverpool finished with 60 points - their lowest tally since the 2015-16 campaign and 25 points behind champions Arsenal.

“That this was a difficult decision for us to make as a club goes without saying. The contribution Arne has made to Liverpool FC in the time that he has been with us has been significant, meaningful and - most importantly of all to supporters and ourselves - successful,” Liverpool’s owners Fenway Sports Group (FSG) said in a statement.

“As such, our appreciation for everything he has achieved could not be greater, particularly as it was underpinned by a work ethic, a diligence and a level of expertise which further underlined our view that he is a leader in his field.

“From the moment that we first encountered Arne, it was immediately clear that he is an individual who does not merely accept responsibility, he embraces it.”

Liverpool had insisted that a change of head coach was not on the agenda, but after assessing the situation following the end of the season last weekend, the club’s hierarchy believe the next phase requires a more front-foot, aggressive and urgent style of football.

The decision to sack Slot was made by Michael Edwards, FSG’s chief executive, and Richard Hughes, Liverpool’s sporting director.

Iraola, 43, is one of the most highly-rated coaches in Europe and is known for his attacking style of play.

He was appointed at Bournemouth when Hughes was technical director at the Cherries, a role he left in 2024 to join the Reds.

Bournemouth finished only one place and three points behind Liverpool to qualify for next season’s Europa League.

Slot replaced Jurgen Klopp as Liverpool boss in 2024 after the German stepped down at Anfield after nine years as manager.

Earlier this month, forward Mohamed Salah said the club must return to being a “heavy metal attacking team that opponents fear” after “crumbling” to a defeat at Aston Villa.

Much of Liverpool’s success under Klopp - where they won every major trophy - came through this style of play.

“The conclusion we have come to is built on a belief that the team’s trajectory is best addressed through a change of direction. That does not diminish the work Arne has done here, or the respect we have for him. Nor is it a reflection of his talents. Rather, it is indicative of the need for a different approach,” the statement added.

“Arne leaves with our gratitude, with a Premier League title to his name, and with the knowledge that he and his family will always be welcomed back at Anfield.”

Slot’s backroom staff are also widely expected to leave, although there has been no announcement from the club on their positions yet.

Liverpool spent £415m last summer on six players - the highest outlay in a single window by a British club - in a bid to retain their title.

They broke the British transfer record to sign Alexander Isak from Newcastle for a fee of £125m and also bought Bayer Leverkusen and Germany playmaker Florian Wirtz for a club record £116m.

In July, forward Diogo Jota died in a car crash - a player who featured regularly under Slot.

“We would like to take this opportunity to place on record our appreciation for Arne, who will always hold a special place in the history of this football club as the coach who delivered Liverpool’s 20th league title,” the statement added.

“That accomplishment - made all the more remarkable as it arrived in his very first season in charge - was built on outstanding coaching and leadership every single day.

“He also helped guide the club through one of the most difficult periods imaginable following the loss of Diogo. The compassion and humanity he showed throughout that time said a great deal about him as a person.

“As such, we can only wish Arne well in the next stage of his coaching career, with our expectation being that he will continue to be successful. We do so in the knowledge that his Liverpool legacy is intact and will become yet more meaningful in the years and decades to come.”

Slot sacking completes a remarkable fall from grace

Arne Slot was hailed as the perfect successor to charismatic Jurgen Klopp after winning the Premier League in his first season.

Arne Slot’s sacking at Liverpool completes one of the most remarkable falls from grace of any Premier League title-winning manager.

Chelsea sacked three managers swiftly after the same success as Slot – but then owner Roman Abramovich’s unique demands made them a special case.

This is Liverpool, the supposed bastion of stability.

Carlo Ancelotti was sacked by Chelsea at the end of his second season in 2011 after winning the league and FA Cup double in his first. Jose Mourinho’s second spell at Stamford Bridge ended when he was axed in December 2015, seven months after winning the title, as they lay one point above the relegation zone.

Antonio Conte went the same way in July 2018 after winning the title in his first season then FA Cup in his second, while Leicester City dismissed Claudio Ranieri in February 2017 as they were only one point off the relegation places nine months after their remarkable Premier League triumph.

But none, arguably, have been shown the door from an earlier position of such strength as Slot – sacked a year after winning the title with ease in his first season in succession to Jurgen Klopp, then having his squad bolstered by a staggering £450m spending spree.

So why did it unravel for the Dutch head coach who many Liverpool fans initially regarded as the calm, transitional Bob Paisley figure to predecessor Klopp’s firebrand, charismatic Bill Shankly?

Slot’s seamless transition from the iconic Klopp saw the German’s squad – with only the addition of £10m Juventus forward Federico Chiesa – win the title by 10 points with four games to spare, losing only twice until the job was done with victory over Tottenham Hotspur.

So was Slot purely the beneficiary of taking over ready-made title winners then simply steering them to glory?

This would be incredibly harsh on Slot and his achievements.

Slot calmed understandable post-Klopp anxiety with his measured approach, but made key alterations that took away some of the thrilling chaos that preceded him to turn the title race into a procession.

Liverpool’s main transfer target on Slot’s appointment was Real Sociedad’s Spain midfielder Martin Zubimendi, now at Arsenal.

With the deal almost done, Zubimendi decided to stay in La Liga, to the widespread angst of those Liverpool fans demanding big signings.

Slot blocked out the noise, turning to his countryman Ryan Gravenberch, something of an under-achiever under Klopp, to take the “number 6” role designated for Zubimendi.

It was a masterstroke, with Gravenberch outstanding as he provided the platform for a more organised Liverpool, not as exciting as under Klopp but cohesive, organised winners.

Slot also produced another key tactical move by using Luis Diaz, a gifted but occasionally erratic winger, as a striker. It was not the Colombian’s natural position but it suited him perfectly as he made many match-winning contributions.

He also won over Liverpool’s biggest names who had under-pinned the Klopp glories of winning the Premier League, Champions League, FA Cup and two League Cups.

Mohamed Salah had arguably his finest season as Liverpool’s squad bought into Slot’s methods as one - although this relationship turned to open hostility, at least on the Egyptian’s side, surfacing in two public outbursts, one in an interview and another on social media, that undermined the head coach.

Salah’s form fell off a cliff in previously unimaginable fashion before he announced this would be his final season at Liverpool after a magnificent career.

Yes, Slot inherited what Klopp described as Liverpool 2.0, but it was also a squad that had finished nine points off the title when the German left. The Dutchman changed that.

Slot was bequeathed quality, but he put his own stamp on it to make Liverpool title winners. To suggest otherwise is to downgrade his work unfairly.

Liverpool’s 20th title, equalling Manchester United, was a cause of rejoicing from their global fanbase. The summer was meant to be a time of celebration basking in that success.

Instead, it was a summer of tragedy.

The title parade around the city was predictably joyous, with red plumes of smoke engulfing the famous Liver Birds at the Pier Head.

Joy turned to horror as 54-year-old Paul Doyle crashed his car into supporters on nearby Water Street during the celebrations, injuring more than 130 people.

Doyle was jailed for 21 years and six months after pleading guilty to 31 charges, admitted dangerous driving, affray, 17 charges of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent, nine counts of causing GBH with intent and three counts of wounding with intent.

And then, on 3 July, much-loved striker Diogo Jota, 28 was killed in a car crash, along with his 25-year-old brother Andre Silva, while driving in the Spanish province of Zamora.

Liverpool, as a club, city and fanbase, were heartbroken. Jota was hugely-popular as a team-mate and player, leaving those at Liverpool grief-stricken.

Jota’s song is sung in the 20th minute of every game – he wore number 20 – while Andrew Robertson referenced his close friend after Scotland qualified for the World Cup.

Only those at Liverpool know how much of an emotional toll this has taken as their grief has been mostly private, but it was a devastating occurrence and is still raw.

Most observers – including this one – believed Liverpool’s title was theirs to lose after one of the most spectacular summers of spending in Premier League history.

After keeping their powder dry following Slot’s arrival, a strategy rewarded with the title, Liverpool embarked on a remarkable spree.

This included £125m British record signing Alexander Isak from Newcastle United, £116m Germany golden boy Florian Wirtz from Bayer Leverkusen, another £70m striker in Hugo Ekitike from Eintracht Frankfurt, as well as another £70m on full-backs Milos Kerkez and Jeremie Frimpong from Bournemouth and Bayer Leverkusen respectively.

Liverpool raked in more than £250m from sales of players such as striker Darwin Nunez to Saudi Pro League club Al-Hilal, Diaz to Bayern Munich and Jarell Quansah to Bayer Leverkusen.

Trent Alexander-Arnold left for Real Madrid at the end of his contract while, of course, the whole club and its support was devastated by Jota’s death.

Alexander-Arnold and Diaz, outstanding at Bayern, have been sorely missed.

Liverpool’s outlay, however, did not strengthen their squad. It made it worse, which takes some doing.

It left the squad mediocre and unbalanced as expensive new acquisitions spluttered or suffered injuries, while their recruitment team failed to deliver one of their most significant targets.

There are many questions around Slot’s transfer dealings, although owners Fenway Sports Group’s CEO of football Michael Edwards and sporting director Richard Hughes must also take responsibility.

Liverpool’s key pair of power brokers were showered with bouquets in the summer. Now they must take the brickbats.

How did such a splurge leave an unbalanced team?

Why did Liverpool not sign competition for Mohamed Salah and Cody Gakpo on the flanks?

Was enough thought given to how Wirtz would be utilised as Liverpool revelled in beating Manchester City to his signature?

Did they really need to spend £125m on Isak having spent £70m on Ekitike?

Were they too complacent in assuming Crystal Palace would just give up on Marc Guehi?

Liverpool appeared so committed to the Isak deal, the player so exiled at Newcastle after his one-man strike to get a move, that it felt like they could not turn away, even after signing Ekitike.

Did they really need Isak? The more you watched Liverpool before he broke a leg while scoring a goal in a victory at Tottenham Hotspur in December, the more he resembled the most expensive vanity purchase in Liverpool history.

Isak arrived unfit then got a groin injury. When he did play, at the expense of the one signing who was playing well at that point, Ekitike, he looked listless and off the pace, poor value for money at such an exorbitant fee.

The broken leg was another serious disruption for a player meant to provide Liverpool with a lethal spearhead. Even his return was interrupted by “minor” fitness issues.

Wirtz, whose deployment behind the strikers disrupted Liverpool’s midfield bedrock to leave them horribly vulnerable all season, has been shifted around from his central role to the flanks as Slot has sought answers. He has shown glimpses of real class but, like Liverpool, nowhere near enough.

And having collected new signings at such a rate, did it mean Slot and Liverpool pushed a key capture down their list of priorities then failed to get it done?

Crystal Palace captain and England defender Guehi was a top target, not merely as partner to Virgil van Dijk but as cover to Ibrahima Konate, whose contract is coming to an end.

Cue the perfect storm.

Palace refused to sell. Konate’s form went into sharp decline. Van Dijk suddenly looked fallible. A solution was lost as Quansah had been sold.

When January came, Manchester City needed defensive reinforcements and paid a bargain £20m for Guehi, £15m less than Liverpool belatedly agreed.

It was intriguing to hear Slot describe Guehi as a “great signing” after he was outstanding in Manchester City’s win at Anfield.

And through it all, Slot lost the golden touch that was so assured in his first season.

He changed formations and personnel without success. The substitutions that worked so well last season now whiffed off desperation – such as defender Konate for striker Ekitike after 55 minutes of the 3-0 home loss to Nottingham Forest – accompanied by some questionable post-match verdicts and talk of “positives” when there were none.

The season started with Liverpool looking gung-ho and wide open. Wins were secured through the high-wire act of last-gasp winners, but once Crystal Palace turned the tables with an injury time goal at Selhurst Park in September to inflict their first defeat, it all fell apart.

The precious gift of “20/20” hindsight is a wonderful thing.

It is easy to say now that Liverpool bowed to sentimentality by giving lucrative new two-year deals to captain Virgil van Dijk and Mohamed Salah, when to not do so at the time would have sparked fury among supporters.

Van Dijk had captained Liverpool to the title in imperious fashion, cementing his status among the Premier League’s finest defenders.

Salah, meanwhile, looked on a personal mission to return the title to Anfield, which he duly did, scoring 34 goals in 50 starts in all competitions.

The news of the deals, after much speculation, was greeted rapturously by Liverpool’s fans. The sight of Salah - “The Egyptian King” - marking the new deal by being photographed sitting on a throne at Anfield should have been an iconic image.

This season 34-year-old Van Dijk’s game has become error-strewn, the air of invincibility he carried gone as he has been regularly exposed, as proved by moments of panic-stricken defending previously out of character. He has started to look his age.

Salah, 33, lacked the pace and spark of previous years – although he will always have legendary status as a Liverpool great having scored 257 goals in 441 games since arriving from AS Roma in summer 2017.

He did, however, temporarily tarnish his standing with his infamous “thrown under the bus” outburst at Elland Road after he was left on the bench at Leeds United in December.

And Salah’s outpouring of angst after a 4-2 loss at Aston Villa did Slot no favours at all. It increased the noise around the Dutchman at a time when he needed it least.

It also carried all the hallmarks of a fading superstar shaking his fist at the skies after such a poor season for Liverpool and, we must not forget, Salah.

The new contracts for two ageing stars suddenly look very dubious – but this is easy to say now. Very little criticism came Slot or Liverpool’s way when they were paraded as a coup in the summer.

All this combined to produce a desperate situation Slot could not control as the damaging defeats piled up, leading to an inevitable conclusion.

Now, a year after being hailed a hero, Arne Slot is out of Anfield.

The tactics that could win Arsenal the Champions League

Arsenal are bidding to win the Champions League for the first time

Mikel Arteta’s Arsenal are hoping to follow up their Premier League triumph with a Champions League trophy against Paris St-Germain on Saturday but know a mammoth task is ahead.

Arsenal’s men have thrived in Europe with a high possession approach that has minimised the number of chances they concede, boasting the most clean sheets (9) in the competition so far.

Luis Enrique’s PSG, by comparison, have only five clean sheets but are the tournament’s top scorers with 44 goals to Arsenal’s 29.

Although these stats set the game up as the best attack against the best defence, Arteta will hope his side are front-footed, playing in PSG’s half as they did for large parts of the two legs in last season’s semi-final exit.

A tactic that worked impressively - despite the narrow defeat - in the second-leg tie between the two sides last season was the use of midfielder Mikel Merino as a number nine.

PSG, known for their ability to press intensely and often in a man-to-man fashion, stepped up to Arsenal as they looked to build out from the back.

A key principle of positional play is finding the free man. When opponents apply man-to-man pressure, finding a free man is harder.

With Merino dropping deep into central midfield, PSG centre-back Willian Pacho was reluctant to follow him, which allowed the French team to keep an extra player in the defensive line.

Arsenal, without a striker, however now had an extra man in midfield.

PSG’s midfield trio, alert to Arsenal’s midfield three, looked to shift across onto Merino at times but this would leave another Arsenal midfielder free helping the Gunners get up the pitch.

Although Swedish striker Viktor Gyokeres has seen out the season in strong form, both Merino, who is fit again after a long absence, and Kai Havertz are players naturally suited to this tactic.

Against high man-to-man pressing, the long ball over the opponent’s attack and midfield is also a valuable tactic.

Merino and Havertz, again, are best placed to bring down or flick on long passes from David Raya before Arsenal’s midfield swarm the second ball making this another tactic to look out for.

Gyokeres could make use of long balls by duelling with defenders in wider areas, looking to run the channels.

Last season, Arsenal struggled to score against PSG, often thanks to Gianluigi Donnarumma’s heroics.

PSG have not conceded many goals this season but Chelsea, RC Lens and Bayern Munich have all attacked well against them.

By positioning their players close to each other, those teams have been able to draw PSG and their man markers higher up the pitch into crowded clusters. This then leaves other parts of the pitch with fewer players.

Releasing the ball from these crowded areas into more open spaces is a tactic that has helped teams break down a resolute PSG, particularly while attacking down the middle.

Arsenal tend to shy away from playing centrally, focusing more on safer attacking play and crosses, as losing the ball centrally makes you more susceptible to a counter attack.

But this might be a risk they could lean into with the likes of Leandro Trossard, Havertz, Bukayo Saka, Martin Zubimendi and Eberechi Eze capable of playing in close proximity under pressure paired with players capable of finishing moves centrally.

Khvicha Kvaratskhelia, an explosive right-footed left winger is one of football’s most dangerous players, and Arsenal will need to keep him quiet.

PSG under Luis Enrique are a very fluid side but follow certain rules as outlined in this tactical analysis of the side earlier in the season.

One of these ideas is that they have certain areas of the pitch they look to keep occupied throughout the game including the two centre-back positions, both flanks, and the centre-forward position - but who moves into these positions is less important.

The many rotations of different players into these areas helps PSG pull apart the opposition’s defensive shape.

Kvaratskhelia naturally finds himself on the left touchline often. From here, his off-the-ball movement stands out.

In PSG’s first leg against Bayern, Desire Doue dropped deep from the attacking line - a common movement Arsenal will need to be alert to.

With Bayern’s Dayot Upamecano less than touch-tight, Doue had time on the ball. Kvaratskhelia feinted to run in behind, then dropped short, then looked to run in behind, dropped short again before eventually running in behind.

These movements froze Bayern’s full-back and Doue clipped a pass in behind for his team-mate to run onto before he cut inside and scored.

If Arsenal are to nullify PSG, in these situations they will have to commit to an approach.

This could be to stay very tight on the players that drop deep so as not to give them time to find runners in behind or they could drop off, letting them have the ball in certain areas but reducing the space in behind their defence.

After going 1-0 down in that first leg last season, Arteta tweaked his side’s defensive approach, saying after the game that “we had one issue that we corrected after 15-20 minutes, that turned the game around”.

Martin Odegaard’s role in the press changed higher up the pitch making it harder for PSG to find their midfielders but the other key difference was the increased pressure and attention William Saliba applied to Dembele. He went man-to-man even when Dembele dropped very deep.

This echoes former Chelsea boss Enzo Maresca’s sentiment too who, after a 3-0 win against PSG in the Club World Cup, said: “The idea was to go man-to-man. PSG are so good that if you give them time you are going to struggle. You have to press them very intensely.”

It would be negligent to write about Arsenal beating a direct opponent without mentioning their most effective tool this season.

PSG have only conceded 29 goals in the league this season but six of them have come from non-penalty set-pieces. The size of their squad makes this an obvious area of weakness.

Thomas Frank’s Spurs lost to PSG in the Champions League earlier this season but managed to score three goals, one coming from a corner. They also lost on penalties against them in the Uefa Super Cup in August, scoring both goals in a 2-2 draw from crossed free kicks.

Under Frank, Spurs adopted various Arteta-isms including making set-plays one of their main methods of breaking teams down.

For all three set-piece goals, Spurs targeted the back post before heading the ball back across goal, either for a teammate or directly to goal.

PSG appear uncomfortable dealing with crosses that float over their heads as they track back and the header back in the other direction goes against the direction they are moving in, giving the attacking side, who know where the ball will go, an advantage.

Arsenal are even better placed for that, so if they are able to get up the pitch in the first place, forcing corner kicks or winning free-kicks will produce good looks at goal.

While there is little that can be done about potential moments of brilliance, there are at least signs of hope that Arsenal can hurt the defending champions.

From 'bling-bling' & disputes to unity: The transformation of PSG

Back in 2011 Qatar Sports Investments were deep in negotiation for the sleeping giant that was Paris St-Germain.

PSG had finished 13th in Ligue 1 the previous season and Nasser Al-Khelaifi, leading the negotiations for QSI, regularly checked the results because there was a fear they could end up buying a second division club.

The Parisians survived and the deal went through, although the club bore almost no resemblance to the modern European contender people know today.

Over the next decade and a half, PSG would undergo one of the most dramatic cultural rebuilds in modern football. Money was about to be spent, stars were going to arrive, but the deep transformation was about reshaping their identity.

The journey unfolded in phases - each necessary, each flawed in its own way, but at the same time each contributing to the club PSG eventually became. The club who will bid to defend their Champions League title against Arsenal on Saturday.

Luis Enrique is bidding to take PSG to a second successive Champions League triumph.

In 2011, PSG were a paradox: a major European capital with a vast talent pool, yet a club lacking structure, prestige and stability.

They had no stars, no sustainable model and no clear footballing philosophy.

Despite having had big names like Ronaldinho, Pauleta, Ludovic Giuly and Claude Makelele in the first decade of the 21st Century, PSG needed to be seen in the eyes of the football world as relevant and credible before they could even dream of competing with Europe’s elite.

The ultras were banned after violence ended in the death of a fan, leaving the Parc des Princes without its most passionate supporters for the first five years of the new era. They only came back in 2016 when Al-Khelaifi decided the majority could not be held responsible for the actions of a few.

The early years of QSI were defined by aggressive spending. Critics labelled it the ‘bling-bling era’ but internally it was seen as the quickest way to get to the top.

As is the case with Newcastle and Manchester City, PSG have had to answer questions about the source of their funding and their owners have been accused of ‘sportswashing’, which is when nations invest in sports to help clean up their tarnished reputations.

Signing global superstars - Zlatan Ibrahimovic, Neymar, Kylian Mbappe, Lionel Messi - helped force PSG into the global conversation.

This phase brought domestic dominance and deep Champions League runs. But it also created internal tensions. Stars dictated dressing-room dynamics, influenced tactical decisions and sometimes overshadowed the collective with inane disputes over things like training schedules or even who should take penalties.

The 18-year-old Mbappe and his family told club representatives he would join PSG instead of Real Madrid only if he was guaranteed to play every game - and Neymar had it written into his contract that he had the power to decide not to travel to some games.

When basketball legend Kobe Bryant visited the old training ground, Neymar and Mbappe wanted to break with the schedule prepared by then head coach Unai Emery.

He had them resting. They wanted to train with a sometimes-missing enthusiasm to impress Kobe. That battle was won by Emery - but those clashes left scars.

This era built PSG’s global brand but it also exposed the limitations of a star-centric model.

Al-Khelaifi publicly declared the end of the bling-bling era.

Instead of asking how to win the Champions League, the starting question became, “What kind of football do we want to play?” The answer was attacking football with French players at its heart.

This reshaped everything that followed. The man appointed to lead PSG into the new dawn was Luis Enrique.

For the first time in the QSI era, the club chose a footballing identity first, then selected the coach, then built the squad.

What happened next was a mixture of a needed change in club mentality and the arrival of the Spanish manager - a force of nature.

Messi, Neymar, Mbappe, Marco Verratti, Sergio Ramos - icons of the previous era - were moved on. The club was not punishing them; they had to reset the order of priorities and no player would be above the team.

Luis Enrique enforced discipline with a clarity PSG had lacked for years. He asked Mbappe to work harder and when his request fell on deaf ears was pleased to see him depart.

A defining moment occurred at the end of September last season when Ousmane Dembele arrived late for training before the Champions League league phase game against Arsenal. It was only 10 minutes but the coach dropped him immediately. Dembele would go on to win the 2025 Ballon d’Or.

Players responded. When Dembele was substituted, he encouraged his replacement rather than sulking. Injured players were required to attend training sessions.

The results were visible in the shape of titles but also in the little details. PSG became the team with the fewest yellow cards in Europe’s top leagues as players stopped arguing with referees, stopped indulging in theatrics and embraced a disciplined, unified approach.

Luis Enrique much prefers to have five players scoring 10-12 goals each over one player scoring 40. This season, PSG had 20 different goalscorers - a testament to the collective approach.

There have been some bumps along the road but the most striking cultural change has been the club’s refusal to panic.

In previous years, a run of poor results would trigger a flurry of signings or internal upheaval. Not any more. PSG now stayed loyal to the squad and the project.

In January 2025 with the French media clamouring for five or six new signings after Champions League defeats against Arsenal, Bayern and Atletico, they made just one… Kvicha Kvaratskhelia.

And perhaps most importantly there was a unified leadership structure. An alignment between the club’s three central figures: Luis Enrique, sporting director Luis Campos and president Al-Khelaifi.

Stability at the top created stability throughout the organisation.

Each figure has a clear role and they work together constantly. Luis Enrique defines the footballing vision, Campos manages recruitment and squad construction while Al-Khelaifi oversees the broader project.

This unity has replaced years of internal friction, when coaches, directors and executives often operated with conflicting priorities.

Of all things that have been achieved at the club the one investment Al-Khelaifi is most proud of is the new training centre that has been created at a cost of about 350million euros (£304m).

A key objective of the cultural reset was restoring PSG’s connection to French identity. Nearly half of the team’s playing time now goes to French players, many from the academy.

This season the average age of PSG’s starting XI was 23 years and 363 days, the lowest recorded by the clubs in Ligue 1 and the second youngest among teams in Europe’s top five leagues. Six academy graduates made their first-team debuts this season.

In a wider footballing context, Al-Khelaifi’s stance against the European Super League also reflected his increasing power and belief in raising the club’s presence.

He argued that if football became a closed system, PSG would never have risen from their Europa League days.

And as leader of the European Club Association, he led the search for peace in European football, making key calls to Barcelona president Joan Laporta and Real Madrid counterpart Florentino Perez to convince them to return to the fore and abandon the Super League project.

PSG are not yet the finished article. The challenges ahead remain significant. Their stadium is too small for a club of PSG’s stature (about 46,000 capacity) and French TV rights lag far behind the Premier League - the top five in the Premier League will receive in the region of 200m euros (£174m) in TV money this season, while PSG will earn about 9m euros (£7.8m).

But at least, for the first time in the QSI era, PSG are a club who know what they want to be and which way they want to go.

From non-league to Champions League final - Raya's fairytale rise

David Raya has won the Premier League with Arsenal and European Championship with Spain after starting out with a loan spell at Southport.

Saturday afternoon. Kick-off approaching. Preparations complete. Crowd filing in. Excitement building.

David Raya fastens his gloves and breathes out.

But this is not the Champions League final. This is Moss Rose, home of National League side Macclesfield Town and a teenage Spanish goalkeeper is embarking on a journey that will lead him to the biggest stage in European football.

In front of fewer than 1,500 spectators, Raya was part of a Southport side beaten 3-0 by Macclesfield in September 2014.

Now aged 30, he is set to become only the third person to make the journey from non-league football to the Champions League final when Arsenal face holders Paris St-Germain on Saturday.

Raya will join Steve Finnan and Chris Smalling in achieving that feat.

Full-back Finnan, who lifted the 2005 title with Liverpool, had earlier played for Welling United in the National League, while centre-back Smalling turned out for Maidstone before going on to be an unused substitute when Manchester United lost the 2011 final to Barcelona.

Even people who have witnessed the journey from a 19-year-old making his first-team breakthrough - after joining Southport on loan from Blackburn Rovers - have struggled to envision Raya’s rise.

Paul Carden, Southport’s former assistant manager, said: “I don’t think anybody could have predicted or scripted it. You wouldn’t be 100% surprised, but you wouldn’t have put a bet on him.”

What makes Raya’s journey so unique is that until he was 16 he was playing in the youth teams of Cornella, a Third Division club based on the outskirts of Barcelona.

But he would swap the small commuter district for Blackburn because the two clubs had a partnership which involved young Spanish footballers travelling to the Lancashire club for trials.

By the time Raya left his home town, he wasn’t a starting goalkeeper for the academy and, when he arrived at Blackburn in 2012 - the season of their relegation from the Premier League - he would face similar struggles because he had Paul Robinson, Jake Kean and Simon Eastwood in front of him.

So after two years in England, Raya made another brave decision in search of first-team football, dropping down a further three leagues to join struggling fifth-tier side Southport, where he experienced the harsh realities of senior football in a temporary four-month spell.

More poor results followed the Macclesfield loss as Martin Foyle was sacked as manager and Gary Brabin took charge along with Carden, who joined from Blackburn’s academy.

“I obviously knew him a little bit as he’d see me about as an academy coach, but quickly you realised he had really good ability,” added Carden.

“You’ve got to give credit to him because he went on a bit of a pathway that not many young lads want to take - and they don’t want to go out and get dirty in non-league.

“They want the niceties of development football and playing at nice grounds on nice pitches or even training grounds. Some lads will be 21 and they won’t have played a real first-team game at any level, but they will have more than 100 appearances in development football.”

Raya used to train three days a week at Southport and then do extra work with Blackburn when his loan club had days off. When he was training with the Merseyside club at Ormskirk’s Edge Hill University, the players used to joke he was good enough to play outfield for them.

That ball-playing ability in a goalkeeper was unheard of at many levels in English football at that time, but Raya was confident enough to showcase his talent in the most stressful situations.

Carden said: “We were really struggling at the time and it was a lot of pressure to win points and win games to stay in the league and we played Kidderminster away, where we won 1-0.

“There was a ball that came back to him, late on in the game, and you’d expect a keeper just to shell it back up the pitch, because he’s getting closed down by one or two forwards, and he’s chopped one of them then just casually passed it out to the full-back.

“We were hearts in mouth in the dugout, but he’s obviously not fazed by it and just got on with it.

“A young Spanish player going into the National League could quite easily have been played on, but whenever teams did, he always came out the other side because of his ability and his confidence.

“It wasn’t arrogance. It was just huge confidence and he had a mindset where he was always determined and very humble.”

During his Southport spell, Carden was aware opposition clubs would try to exploit his 6ft height with high balls and extra physicality, but the Spaniard had traits that “defied” his height.

Raya’s biggest test came in his final game for the club when the Sandgrounders visited Championship side Derby County in the FA Cup third round.

He made multiple fine saves to keep the Rams at bay, and was beaten only by a stoppage-time penalty. At the final whistle, Raya left the pitch in tears after a performance that highlighted his potential.

Carden recalled: “He was bitterly disappointed, but we all were, so that kind of tells you how much he felt at the time for the lads and the club. He was certainly part of the culture in non-league and the dressing room.

“He made some saves in that game where we thought he’s definitely at the level. You could have put him in goal for Derby and he wouldn’t have been out of place.”

Raya returned to Blackburn and made appearances in the Championship, but had to wait until the club’s relegation to League One to become first choice in 2017.

He proved instrumental for Rovers, instantly helping them to return to the second tier.

Jayson Leutwiler was back-up goalkeeper to Raya at Blackburn and saw the match-winning saves that have become so regular during the Spaniard’s time at Arsenal.

“He was able to make saves that would make you think, ‘wow this is a shot that one out of 10 times he would have saved it’,” said the former Canada international.

“But when it happens four, five or six times over the season, that’s just not a coincidence.”

Leutwiler played across England’s lower football leagues and believes playing at that level has great advantages to developing goalkeepers.

“You get exposed to smaller crowds, you get exposed to different pressures, they are difficult leagues, it’s more physical, you have to adapt a bit more,” added the 37-year-old.

“You could go to a great football pitch on a Saturday and the weekend after the conditions aren’t as great, maybe a smaller crowd and it only helps you to be more resilient when it gets to a bigger game at any level.”

Raya was then signed by Brentford for £3m in 2019, before Arsenal completed a £27m deal five years later, after a loan spell.

From that disappointing debut at Macclesfield, he has gone on to shine for club and country - being part of Spain’s victorious 2024 Euros squad and helping Arsenal win the Premier League for the first time in 22 years.

Now the Gunners, and Raya, will cap a dream double if they overcome PSG in Budapest, and leave his old colleagues proud of his achievements.

Carden said: “He had that confidence and that determination, but it didn’t stop him from being a good team-mate.

“Everybody who crossed paths with him at his time at Southport is delighted. It is a real credit to him.

“I don’t think anyone could have written that tale, which is why it’s such a good one.”